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BRIEF OF APPELLEE WARREN J. GRANVILLE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal was taken from a grant of Summary Judgment, in 
favor of the Defendant/Appellee, Warren J. Granville, on May 2, 
1995. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 73-2-2 (Supp. 1994), the 
Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter. 
This matter was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for 
disposition, pursuant to the authority of the Utah Supreme Court. 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (K) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
Plaintiff Joseph Wisden ("Wisden") presents two issues on 
appeal. 
The first issue is whether the district court correctlv 
granted summary judgment on Wisden's claim for False Arrest 
against Warren J. Granville, an Assistant Attorney General for 
Sn.^P !^fi "» TTirni i -n -i •- v tj^  H o V i o ^ •-" 
activity a: issue arose our of Granville's prosecution of Wisden 
in Arizona. 
The second issue is whether the district court correctly 
granted summary judgment on Wisden's claim of fraud when he 
failed to present a prima facia case in support of this claim. 
STANDARDS 0? APPELLATE REVIEW 
A lower court's determination that a grant of Summary 
Judgment is appropriate is reviewed de novo and "for correctness 
without deference to the trial cSurt's ruling." Peterson v. 
Board of Education, 855 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah 1992). 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, 
and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issue before the 
Court is contained in the body of this brief, or is set forth in 
the Wisden's Opening Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedincs Below 
Wisden brought suit on February 1, 1994, in the Fifth 
Judicial Court in Saint George, Utah, alleging that Defendant 
Warren J. Granville intentionally caused improper process to 
issue, resulting in Wisden's arrest, incarceration, extradition 
from Utah to Arizona, and criminal conviction in Arizona. 
(Record, p.i, Complaint.) These events arose from the indictment 
of Wisden on criminal charges for fraud m the Stare cf Arizona. 
{Record, p.271, Indictment. 
After Wisden filed an Amended Complaint (Record, p. 221, 
Amended Complaint), the Arizona Attorney General's Office moved 
for summary judgment, on behalf cf. Granville, based on absolute 
prosecutorial immunity. (Record, p.27, Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment.) At or about the same time, Wisden also moved 
for summary judgment. (Record, p.413, Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment.) The district court held a hearing on the 
issues raised in both summary judgment motions. (Record, p.455/ 
Hearing on Motions for Summary Judgment.) On April 6, 1995, the 
district court, by memorandum decision, ordered Summary Judgment 
in favor of Defendant, Warren J. Granville. (Record, p.4 63, 
Memorandum Decision; Record, p.457, Order.) 
Wisden filed a Notice of Appeal, on May 30, 1995. (Record, 
p.479, Notice of Appeal.) This case was transferred, for 
disposition by the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to an order by 
the Utah Supreme Court dated August 2, 1995. 
3. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On December 15, 1988, in the Arizona Superior Court in and 
for the County of Maricopa County, Arizona, an Arizona grand jury 
indicted Joseph Michael Wisden (Plaintiff) for thirteen Felony 
_ it 
counts or Fraudulent Schemes and Artifices, one Felony count of 
Attempted Fraudulent Schemes and Artifices, and one Felony count 
of Illegal Enterprise. (Record, p.3, Complaint; Record, p.271, 
Indictment. On January 13, 1933, the Honorable Judge 0'Toole of 
the Maricopa County (Arizona) Superior Court issued a warrant for 
Wisden's arrest. (Record, p.15, Warrant for Arrest.) 
On August 23, 1990, the Washington County, Utah, Sheriff's 
Department arrested Wisden, and the Washington County Attorney 
filed a Fugitive Complaint. (Record, p.300, Fugitive Complaint 
No.5010012 33 . y The State of Arizona, relying upon Wisden's 
statements that he would appear voluntarily, did not seek 
extradition. (Record, p.334, Affidavit of Warren J. Granville.; 
Instead, Wisden was allowed to post bail. He then was released 
*V*QT^ custod**7". (Id. ^  
When Wisden failed to appear in Arizona as he had promised, 
Arizona authorities contacted the police in Hurricane City, Utah. 
Cn February 15, 1991, Utah authorities arrested Wisden again, and 
a second Fugitive Complaint was filed. (Record, p.305, Fugitive 
Complaint No.911000305.) On March 6, 1991, the Honorable Judge 
Shumate of the Circuit Court in and for Washington County, Utah, 
dismissed the first Fugitive Complaint. (Record, p.3 07, Order of 
Dismissal.} 
On March 14, 13 91, the Governor of Arizona, Fife Symington, 
issued a Governor's Warrant for the extradition of the Plaintiff. 
[Record p.312, Arizona Governor's Warrant.; However, on March 
21, 1991, before the Extradition Warrant was received by the Utah 
authorities, the Plaintiff requested and was granted a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus. Plaintiff was again released from all restraints 
imposed by the courts of Utah in the County of Washington. 
[Record p.3 08, Order - Habeas Corpus.) 
On August 26, 1991, pursuant to the outstanding extradition 
warrant, a Utah Governor's Warrant was served upon the Plaintiff. 
(Record p.313, Utah Governor's Warrant.) Finally, on September 
6, 1991, the Plaintiff was remanded to the custody of the State 
cf Arizona. At that time, the original arrest warrant was 
executed by the Maricopa County (Arizona) Sheriff's Office. 
(Record p.2 82, Warrant for Arrest.) 
On February 18, 1992, a judge found Wisden guilty on 5 
Felony counts of Fraudulent Schemes and Artifices, and 1 Felony 
count of Illegally Conducting an Enterprise in Maricopa County, 
Arizona, Criminal Cause no. 88-11353. (Record p.324, Minutes 
Dated 2-18-92.) The judge placed Wisden on probation for seven 
years and ordered him to pay restitution in the total amount of 
$33,895.10. (Records p.335, Standard Terms of Probation.) 
Wisden appealed this decision, challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed both the 
criminal conviction and the sentences. (Records p.336, 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Wisden's first allegation, that Prosecutor Granville's 
actions constituted false arrest, was properly rejected on the 
ground of absolute immunity. When a prosecutor takes action 
pursuant to his duties, public policy and common law properly 
protect him from any civil lawsuit, frivolous or not. Without 
w 
D 
this protection, prosecutors would be subject to harassing 
litigation by those, like Wisden, who are pursued by state 
authorities for their criminal acts. 
The allegations here stem from Granville's legal attempts to 
secure Wisden's presence before an Arizona court to answer a 
criminal indictment. Despite Wisden's efforts to avoid facing 
charges, Granville eventually succeeded in securing Wisden's 
arrest and extradition to the Arizona courts, where the criminal 
justice system made Wisden answer for his crimes. 
At all relevant times, Granville acted pursuant to his 
authority as a prosecutor for the Arizona Attorney General's 
Office to make Wisden available for prosecution. "If prosecutors 
are concerned with possible liability when they take the steps 
necessary to make a defendant available for prosecution, the 
decision whether or not to prosecute may be directly affected. 
And that is precisely the type of concern that absolute immunity 
seeks to foreclose." Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 ?.3d 1139, 
1150 (2d Cir. 1995) . Warren J. Granville is entitled to 
absolute immunitv. 
The district court also properly rejected Wisden's second 
assertion that Granville's actions constituted Fraud. Wisden's 
claim is based upon his inaccurate characterization of the arrest 
and extradition process. When an outstanding arrest warrant 
exists from a foreign jurisdiction, local authorities have 
probable cause to arrest the subject. Even without a warrant, 
the suspect can be taken into custody while the other state 
c 
institutes extradition proceedings. The outstanding warrant is 
not extinguished by an arrest, but remains in effect until the 
subject is in the custody of the jurisdiction that issued the 
warrant. Wisden's claim, that he was arrested under an expired 
warrant, is wrong. 
Moreover, Wisden's argument, that Pace v. Parrish, 2 74 P. 2d 
273 (Utah 1552), should be expanded to fit the facts of this 
case, has no factual or legal merit. Pace clearly establishes 
the requirements for a prima facia showing of fraud. Wisden 
cannot establish the majority of the elements necessary to state 
a fraud claim. Furthermore, there is no basis in statute or case 
law for his assertion that fraud can be perpetuated vicariously 
through a third party's reliance on fraudulent 
misrepresentations. Because there is no basis for Wisden's fraud 
claim, this Court should affirm the lower court's summary 
judgment for Granville. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT GRANVILLE'S ACTS 
WERE TAKEN PURSUANT TO HIS RESPONSIBILITIES AS AN 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF ARIZONA, 
THEREBY ESTABLISHING A COMPLETE DEFENSE BASED UPON 
ABSOLUTE PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY. 
The principle cf prosecutorial immunity dates back to the 
old English common law. The Supreme Court traced the history of 
this principle in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 4C9, 96 S. Ct. 984 
(1976). Prosecutorial immunity is "oredicated upon a considered 
7 
inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant 
official and the interests behind it." .Id. at 422, 96 S. Ct. at 
390. These interests include "concern that harassment by 
unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor' 
energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he 
would shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence 
of judgment required by his public trust." Id. at 424, 96 S. Ct 
at 991. The Supreme Court found that these interests would not 
be adequately served by qualified immunity and, therefore, 
concluded that prosecutors must Be afforded absolute immunity. 
The Court reached this conclusion despite the realization 
that "such immunity does leave the genuinely wronged defendant 
without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or 
dishonest action deprives him of liberty." Ici. at 427, 96 S. Ct 
at 993. To temper the onerous effect of its holding, the Court 
explicitly delineated the boundaries of the available immunity, 
limiting it to activities that are an "integral part of the 
judicial process." Id. at 431, 96 S. Ct. at 995. The Supreme 
^ourt" concluded tha*~ absolute immunity ^rcoeriv extends to 
prosecutors "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the 
state's case . . . ." Id. at 432, 96 S. Ct. at 995. 
Subsequent decisions have struggled to identify when a 
prosecutor is acting as an advocate, as an administrator, or as 
an investigator. As a result, courts have determined that if a 
prosecutor's actions "are encompassed within 'the preparation 
necessary to present a case, [they] are immunized as involving 
the crcsecutDr's advocacv functions. " Rose v. Bartle 3 72. F.2d 
331, 334 (1389), (citing, Mevers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1449 
(8th Cir.), cert, denied, 108 S. Ct. 97 (1987)). 
Here, Wisden argued below that the trial court 
allegedly failed to follow one segment of the holding of Weathers 
v, Sbert, 505 ?.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1974), that " [m]aking an 
arrest is a police function, not a judicial one . . . ." 
However, in making this argument, Wisden fails to recognize the 
important distinction between simply ostaimnc authorization for 
an arrest and actually making the arrest. While physically 
taking someone into custody is a police function, obtaining the 
legal authorization to do so fails within the ambit of advocacy. 
Wisden has focused erroneously on the arrest, when the true issue 
he raises about the prosecutor's actions concerns the validitv of 
the arrest warrant, at the time it was served. 
Securing an uncooperative criminal defendant's presence and 
requiring him to answer legitimate charges that have been brought 
against him in another state is a necessary step in the 
prosecution of a criminal case. Warren Granville, as the 
prosecutor, merely requested the entry of a valid felony arrest 
warrant into the computers of the National Crime Information 
Center (NCIC). Wisden's extradition from Utan was a required 
element of the initiation of Arizona's prosecution of Wisden.1 
1
 When he was arrested in Utah, Wisden instituted a series 
of tactics designed to delay his return to Arizona. He initially 
agreed to waive extradition and appear voluntarily, but failed to 
honor his promise. Wnen Wisden failed to appear, the warrant was 
again entered into the NCIC computer. Wisden was rearrested and 
9 
Contrary to Wisden's assertions, M[o]ne of the most 
important duties of a prosecutor pursuing a criminal proceeding 
is to ensure [the] defendants . . . . presen[ce] at trial." 
Ehrlich v. Guliani. 910 F.2d 1220, 1223 (4th Cir. 1990). "If 
prosecutors are concerned with possible liability when tney take 
seeps necessary to make a defendant available for prosecution, 
the decision whether or not to prosecute may be direcnly 
effected. And that is precisely the type of concern that 
absolute immunity seeks to foreclose." Pinaud. 52 F.3d at 1150. 
Wisden's only other argument is based on dicta contained in 
a footnote of a concurring opinion in Imbler, 424 U.S. at 441 
n.6, 96 S. Ct. at 1000 n.6. In that footnote, Justice White, 
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, explained that the 
majority's opinion appeared to unnecessarily expand absolute 
prosecutorial immunity. The three Justices expressed concern 
that a broadly interpreted absolute prosecutorial privilege would 
foreclose legitimate actions for intentional constitutional 
violations, especially subornation of perjury and the withholding 
of exculpatory evidence. However, the dissent conceded that even 
where "the prosecutor's decision to prosecute was malicious and 
without probable cause - at least where there is no independent 
allegation that the prosecutor withheld exculpatory information 
. . the judicial process is better served by absolute immunity 
than by any other rule." Imoler, 424 U.S. at 43 8, 96 S.Ct. at 
the extradition proceedings were instituted. (Record p.33, 
Affidavit of Warren Granville.) 
999. Under this standard, the court below correctly granted 
summary j udgmenu. 
Point 2. 
WISDEN'S ASSERTION THAT THE PARAMETERS OF PACE V. 
PARISH SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO FIT THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE, HAS NO FACTUAL OR LEGAL MERIT. FURTHER, THERE IS 
NO LEGAL BASIS FOR WISDEN'S ASSERTION THAT FRAUD CAN BE 
PERPETUATED VICARIOUSLY VIA THE ACTS OF GOVERNMENT 
AGENTS. 
Wisden's second issue alleges that Warren Granville 
committed fraud by requesting that an executed arrest warrant be 
entered into the NCIC computer. However, the arrest warrant 
issued by the Superior Court of the State of Arizona remained 
valid until Arizona secured custody of Wisden. The trial court, 
therefore, properly rejected this theory of liability. 
"The general rule of law in this situation is that a warrant 
of arrest issued in one state can not be executed outside the 
boundary of the issuing state. . . . [However] where an officer 
of the non-issuing state has knowledge of the warrant, probable 
cause exists for the arrest in that state." State v. Everett, 
110 Ariz. 429, 431, 520 P.2d 301 (1974), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 
83C (1974) (citations emitted;. The mere existence of a felony 
aires: warrant from another jurisdiction constitutes probable 
cause for arrest without a warrant, After taking a fleeing felon 
into custody, the arresting authority may hold the felon for a 
reasonable time to allow the state that issued the warrant to 
institute extradition proceedings. Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-3 0-14 
and 77-3 0-15 (Uniform Extradition Act). 
Wisden's claim that the Arizona arrest warrant was executed 
at the time of his initial arrest, and was therefore invalid at 
the time of his second arrest, is erroneous. Here, each time 
Utah authorities took Wisden into custody, it constituted an 
arrest without a warrant. The Utah authorities acted on 
information from the NCIC computer because Arizona had an 
outstanding arrest warrant for Wisden. This action was 
consistent with the Uniform Extradition Act. id. Throughout the 
events in question, the Arizona warrant remained valid. 
Prosecutor Granville could not commit fraud because the warrant, 
entered into the NCIC computer, remained valid. 
Additionally, there is no legal basis for Wisden's assertion 
that he was the victim of "fraud by proxy." No such cause of 
action exists.2 The only theory Wisden offers on this point is 
his suggestion that the concept of agency can be expanded to 
cover the present situation. Under this theory, Wisden would 
hold Granville responsible for the allegedly fraudulent acts of 
Utah law enforcement officials. However, there is simply no 
basis for this proposition under statute or case law. 
Furthermore, even if Wisden's theory were viable, he would 
still be required to present a prima facia case for fraud. The 
,?
 [e] lements of actionable fraud to be proved are a false 
representation of existing material fact, made knowingly or 
recklessly, for the purpose of inducing reliance thereon, upon 
2
 Wisden's claim that he was unable to research this point 
is irrelevant to this proceeding. 
12 
which plaintiff reasonable relies to his injury." Pace v. 
Parrish, 274 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952). Wisden has failed to offer 
the trial court any evidence that there was a knowing or reckless 
false misrepresentation of fact, by Warren Granville or anyone 
else. To do so, Plaintiff would i^ eed to offer proof that the 
arrest warrant was invalid, that the party knew that the arrest 
warrant was invalid, and that the party chose to pursue the 
warrant anyway. Further, Wisden would have to show that the 
party intended to induce Wisden's reliance on the fraudulent 
misrepresentations. Finally, Wisden would have to show that he 
suffered injury. 
Wisden did not — and cannot—meet any of these requirements. 
First, the warrant remained valid at all times. Second, neither 
Warren Granville, nor anyone else, intended to induce or actually 
induced any action by Wisden. Finally, Wisden did not suffer 
'injury.7 Any detriment that resulted from Wisden's appearance 
before the Arizona court was the result of his own criminal 
behavior, not any sinister scheme concocted by Warren Granville 
and Utah's law enforcement officials. 
Wisden's fraud claim has no merit. The summary judgment in 
favor of Warren Granville should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's decision, to grant summary judgment to 
Warren Granville, should be affirmed. Because of the frivolous 
nature of the case, Appellee Warren Granville respectfully 
1 *5 
requests attorney's fees for this appeal 
Dated this U.y day of October, 1995 
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